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Some Basic Problems in Criminology
By

JEROME HALL

THE enormous literature on methodology which has appeared in the
last decade has, despite criticism and
admonitions from certain quarters,' resulted in a much clearer appreciation of
the limitations of contemporary social
science. Thus, for example, there is
now considerable understanding of the
huge proportions and significance of
linguistic difficulties. If, as Sapir and
others tell us, language is the vehicle of
thought, then the difficulties are by no
means purely philological; much more,
they require an infinitely more thoroughgoing analysis than has heretofore
been attempted. This means that for
an indefinite period to come, the language problem and all that it involves
will be a chief concern of social scientists.
There are other valuable lessons to
be learned from this literature, for
these discussions have been pushed
sufficiently far to permit a more sophisticated reading and evaluation of
sociological writing than was previously
possible. We are able to see many
interrelationships among the problems
investigated. And we are beginning to
understand how much of social "science" is really social policy more or
less disguised; in short, how much of
sociological writing consists of expressions of approbation or displeasure.
And in the rare instances where a high
degree of objectivity exists, we are in a
better position to understand and
evaluate the particular job by our
greater appreciation of the various
fundamental approaches to and interpretations of social science. In short,

our frames of reference have been constructed for us.
All of the above applies to criminology more forcibly than to most
social disciplines. For purposes of simplifying this discussion and keeping it
within the set boundary, we shall present very briefly three principal approaches which for convenience may be
termed the "rigorous scientific," the
"scientific method," and the "unique
data" interpretations, respectively.
The knowledge found in criminology
may be subsumed under different
categories described in the various interpretations set forth. From such a
demonstration of the relationship of
criminology to these three interpretations of social science, and of the relationship of these interpretations to each
other, it is hoped that something will be
added to our understanding of some of
the major problems presented by the
contemporary literature of criminology.

1

Ellwood, C. A., "Scientific Method in
Sociology" (1931), 10 Social Forces 15-21.

THE RIGOROUS SCIENTIFIC
POSITION

Very happily for our present undertaking, we may set forth the "rigorous
scientific" position by reference to the
recent publication of the most thoroughgoing critique on criminology and
criminal law and its administration
that has yet appeared.2 This analysis
of the field is the product both of a logician and philosopher and of a law
teacher who has had many years of
practice at the bar. After a comprehensive survey of the field, they arrive
at the following conclusions:
2Michael, J., and M. J. Adler, Crime, Law and
Social Science, Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1933.
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I. There is no scientific knowledge in the
field of criminology.
A. We have no knowledge of the causes
of criminal behavior or of the effects of different modes and varieties of treatment upon actual or
potential offenders, or of the
efficacy of programs and measures
of prevention.
1. In the absence of such knowledge
we are and will continue to
be impotent to control criminal behavior.
B. The knowledge which has resulted
from criminological research is
knowledge descriptive of the
characteristics of criminals and of
their environments.
C. This descriptive knowledge has little utility in the solution of the
practical problem of controlling
criminal behavior, either through
programs of prevention or through
the official treatment of offenders.
1. It can be employed only in
trial and error attempts to
control criminal behavior,
and therefore has little practical value.
2. Such attempts cannot now be
made the basis of experimental programs and, therefore, have little theoretical
significance.
II. Empirical scientific research in criminology cannot be undertaken at the
present time.
A. The subject matter of criminology is
criminal behavior, andcriminology
is, therefore, a dependent science.
B. Criminology depends in large part
upon the subject matter of psychology and sociology, and these
subject matters have not yet been
developed as empirical sciences.
C. Since no theory or analysis has been
developed in the fields of psychology and sociology, scientific research is not yet possible in these
fields.
D. The possibility of scientific research
in psychology and sociology depends upon radical changes in the
methodology of investigation in

these fields, and this, in turn, depends upon the correction of the
misconception or inadequate conception of empirical science and
scientific method which is now
prevalent in these fields and which
we have characterized as raw
empiricism.3

Without attempting a systematic
summarization of this book, which is

impossible within the limits of this
paper, we shall very briefly present the
general thesis maintained, which led to
the above conclusions, namely:
Problems are either theoretical or
practical. Practical problems concern
affairs, procedure, or action; they involve the fixing of an end which it is
desired to achieve, and the determina-

tion of meansto accomplishit. Onthe
other hand, theoretical problems are
questions as to knowledge-never as to
decisions. When we answer theoretical problems our conclusions are either
true, false, or probable; whereas the
answers to a practical problem are wise
3 Ibid., pp. 390-391; and in connection with the
last statement above, note: ". . . the scientific
method . . . is hardly more than the native
method of solving problems, a little clarified from
prejudice and a little cultivated by training. A
detective with his murder mystery, a chemist
seeking the structure of a new compound, use
little of the formal and logical modes of reasoning.
Through a series of intuitions, surmises, fancies
they stumble upon the right explanation, and
have a knack of seizing it when it once comes
within reach. I have no patience with attempts
to identify science with measurement which is
but one of its tools, or with any definition of the
scientist which would exclude a Darwin, a Pasteur or a Kekule." Gilbert Lewis, The Anatomy
of Science, p. 6.
Cf. also, "The principle of the scientific
method, in fact, is only a refinement, by analysis
and controls, of the universal process of learning
by experience. This is usually called common
sense. The scientific addition to common sense
is merely a more penetrating analysis of the complex factors involved, even in seemingly simple
events, and the necessity of numerous repetitions
and controls before conclusions are established."
A. J. Carlson, "Science and the Supernatural"
(1931), 73 Science, 218.
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or unwise, intelligent or unintelligent,
just or unjust. There are two ways of
determining whether means are adapted
to ends: common sense and the method
of empirical science. Common sense is
frequently adequate and in the degree
that the practical problem is simple;
with increased complexity, common
sense becomes more and more inadequate.
After stating the problems which
arise from crime, the criminal law and
its administration, the authors of the
survey proceed to their most basic inquiry, namely, "the conditions of a
science of criminology."4 "Criminology consists of information about
the activities and nature of criminals,
their environments, and the ways in
which they are officially and unofficially treated by social agents and
agencies."5 The central problem in
criminology is that of the causes of
crime; accordingly the significance of
criminological knowledge depends upon
the ability of this knowledge to solve
the etiological problem. A cause is
discovered by finding "the precise nature of the relation of dependence which
obtains between a given item on the
one hand and one or more items on the
other hand."' Interdependent items
are called yariables, and the inquiry involves the nature of their covariation.
SCIENCE DEFINED

The authors then define science: it
consists of propositions which must
have (1) generality, (2) determinate
validity, (3) a formal character as a relation of variables, and (4) compendency. If the validity of all the propositions rests upon the validity of a small
number of propositions, that is, if we
have a systematically ordered set of
propositions, we have a rational science
4 Michael and Adler, op. cit., Ch. V.
5 Ibid., p. 46.
1 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

IN CRIMINOLOGY

121

as distinct from an empirical science.
Say Professors Michael and Adler:
"The body of knowledge called criminology does not contain a single scientific proposition."'7 They inform us as
to what must be done: First, the research must be directed by a problematic proposition;8second, the data must
be both reliable and accurate; third, the
data of observation must be developed
by processes of inference.
As will be noted by reference to the
above summarization, the approach
taken consists of setting up a very
rigorous definition of "science" and
classifying the knowledge in the field of
criminology with reference to that
definition. That the adherents of this
position are perfectly aware of their
procedure is definitely shown by their
statement that "we are using empirical
science in a sense which includes physics and excludes anatomy."' If this
terminology is borne in mind, their
classification of criminology as "common sense" knowledge becomes perfectly understandable. They intend
no depreciation of the knowledge in
criminology in itself, but only in comparison with science as defined. In
fact, the authors of the work referredto
are really upon common ground with
many students of criminology in recognizing the value for certain purposes
and within certain limits, of the best research in criminology.10
I7bid., p. 58.
8 Cf. Professor E. W. Patterson:
"...

one
must have some vaguely felt aim or need at the
outset, but that one need not have a sharply
formulated proposition to test. One must be
willing to be led by the facts, one must realize
that knowledge is a process of interaction between sense-data and the assumptions of prior
experience. Incipient generalizations become
irrelevant because they are supplanted by discriminations suggested by the data turned up in
investigation." "Can Law Be Scientific?"
(1930) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 145.
9 Michael and Adler, op. cit., Preface, p. xxi.
10 Ibid.,
pp. 331-2.
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is not scientific. Thus, Professors
Michael and Adler state that scientific
The second position, which was in- methods are not employed at present in
spired largely by Pearson and in which social research."3 To understand their
major emphasis is placed upon method, position, reference must be had to their
is that taken by the younger group of definition of the two terms "science"
sociologists. Many of these students (which has been stated above) and
of the social disciplines, in sharp con- " method."'14
trast with the older scholars, were reExactly the same observations with
cruited from physics, biology, and other regard to the necessity for definition
sciences (note that we use the word less must be made with reference to the
rigorously than above). In any event, content of the social sciences. Althey studied the natural sciences and though the younger sociologists freely
attempted to take over as much of the admit that they have not discovered
methodology as could be employed on anywhere near the number of scientific
the particular social data studied. generalizations which are found in the
The demarcation of narrow areas for exact sciences, they nevertheless assert
intensive empirical research has thus that scientific laws are simply descripdistinguished contemporary social sci- tions of general types of behavior under
ence from the comprehensive systems certain specified conditions, and that
associated with the work of scholars the sociologists have already discovered
like Spencer and Ward.
a number of such laws.15
As has been stated, the major em13They select psychometrics and mathematical
phasis of this group has been upon economics
as the only scientific divisions of the
method. Their examination of the social
disciplines. Both of these fields, it is subnatural sciences leads them to conclude mitted, in so far as they are exact, are branches
that although techniques vary and are of mathematics, numbers being more or less
admittedly more highly developed in arbitrarily assigned to data, and in this aspect
the exact sciences, nevertheless the are not social sciences at all. In the latter field,
mathematical formulee could be readily fitted to
method employed (meaning thereby at the concept of the "economic man" of classical
its minimum the "logic of measure- economists, which involves quite a different
ment "11) is common. Thus, Dr. matter from dealing with human beings. Current institutional economics as a reaction from
George Lundberg writes:
classical economics is significant from this point
But when a generalcriterionor definition of view.
14That they apparently insist upon techniques
of scienceis attemptedit is foundthat such
definitiontends to be in terms of method as an essential part of "scientific method" may
ratherthan of subject-matter. All that the be gathered from the following: "The generalizaterm scienceas appliedto a particularfield tions of empirical science, like those of common
rest upon experience and are derived from
comes to mean is a field which has been sense,
it by prudence and intelligence; they differ in
studiedaccordingto certainprinciples,i. e., that in their derivation
intelligence is directed
SCIENTIFICMETHOD

according to scientific method.12

Until it is carefully defined, the
word "method," like the word "science," means all things to all men; and
until attention is centered upon precisely the same phenomena, it is futile
to assert that a particular method is or
11G. A. Lundberg, in an unpublished paper.
12Idem, Social Research, p. 92.

methodically and is aided by special techniques,
and in that taken together they constitute an
analysis of some limited portion of experience
which is the subject matter of a particular sci-

ence." Op.cit., Preface,p. xxii.

Cf. G. Lewis and A. J. Carlson quoted in note

3, supra.
15 Thus Dr. Lundberg writes: "What is a scientific law, but a brief description of how phenomena behave under given conditions? This is not
only possible but has been practiced in a more or
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Classification of knowledge-If attention is now directed to some
of the best research in criminology, as,
for example, parole prediction and ecological studies of juvenile delinquency,
several results follow. If our purpose
is to classify this type of knowledge, the
particular criteria selected will in part
determine the distribution made. If
the criteria be narrowed to methods,
and methods be limited to the "logic of
measurement," then these studies are
"scientific." (We are referring here
only to the classifications employed in
the two positions discussed above.) If
the criteria are propositions characterized by a relation of variables, compendency, and so forth, and if methods
include the techniques of physics, then
the studies referred to cannot be "scientific" but must be "common sense")
or some other category which is more
apt.
less systematic way from the very beginning of
society. All that social science aims to do is to
change this practice from a rule-of-thumb procedure to an objective and more exact practice."
"The uniformities in physical data which form
the basis of all physical science are also observable in social data. As we have noted, scientific
laws specify certain simple and frequently artificial conditions under which phenomena behave
in a certain way. Under these conditions, the
behavior can be predicted with a high degree of
accuracy. Likewise we can predict, with a high
degree of accuracy, how many people in a given
city will be born, will die, commit suicide, or get
married during the coming year, provided, the
significant conditions obtaining during the past
years on which our observations are based remain the same." Social Research, pp. 12, 15.
And Dr. Read Bain, another adherent of the
position presented, writes: "But sociology and
other social sciences are rapidly building up a
vast body of sound scientific knowledge which by
reason of its quantic nature and criticism of
common sense, or both, sounds as strange to the
man on the street as endocrinology, radioactivity,
or theories of immune sera." "The Concept of
Complexity in Sociology: II" (1930), 3 Social
Forces 373.

123

Clearly, if the term "common sense"
is used as in ordinary speech, objections
can be raised to the subsumption of
the knowledge acquired through the
methods employed to construct the
prediction tables, under this category.
However, it is obvious that the adherents of the position first described do
not use the term in its ordinary connotation. They mean merely that it is
not "scientific" (as rigorously defined
by them). And they add, "we have
not meant to say that such knowledge
is the common possession of all men or
that those men who possess it, have it
to the same degree." 16
A suggestedsolutionThe opposition between the two
positions thus far presented is in large
part resolved by taxonomic analysis.
A possible solution which suggests itself is the adoption of a third category
intermediate between "science," rigorously defined, and "common sense" as
ordinarily understood. The use of the
latter term cannot fail to connote
knowledge which is common, despite
the warning given in this connection.
There accordingly is need, for certain
important purposes, to have a third
category which will include such researches as those mentioned; which
will include psychiatry and medicine
and other knowledge arrived at by the
use of orderly, systematic procedures,
and the application of which requires a
trained, experienced judgment.
So far as we know, it is a debatable
question whether the use of objective
techniques calls for a different kind of
thinking from common sense methods, or indeed, whether these differ
from the mental processes employed in
rigorous scientific analysis or observation. The question of the validity of
categories invented to represent alleged differences in method cannot be
16 Michael

and Adler, op. cit., p. 331.
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settled absolutely; and the only clue
that can be suggested is that all classifications are constructed to meet particular needs (and for some, we want
to emphasize the results of our thinking
rather than our process). It depends,
in short, very largely upon the purpose
in hand.
Under the circumstances and within
the above limitations, all that can be
stated is that it is possible to detect
differentiae which are significant for a
great many purposes. And it seems
to the writer (which may be purely a
personal predilection) that there is a
broad basis for differentiating social
science both from common sense and
from empirical science as defined; from
the latter because it is not exact, and
from the former because it is not common but confined to persons who have
had specialized experience in a particular field which qualifies them for an
efficient behavior which cannot be
expected of laymen however intelligent
they may be.
To this distinctive content of the
social disciplines must be added another difference (from common sense)
which they possess, namely, an orderly
method which operates through the
agency of various more or less elaborate
techniques, a method which is carefully designed to eliminate bias, to
make possible the detection of all
relevant data, to make use of all verifiable data, and to record the results so
that they may be checked by other
investigators. Of course there remains,
among others, the difficulty that unanimity is not quite so readily determined as in the physical sciences; nor
is it so widespread, which is to be
expected.
We know no way of determining the
question regarding an adequate terminology except by reference to utility.17
1' Cf. "It is entirely arbitrary whether a
given word shall be used to indicate a similarity

The desiderata of definiteness of denotation, comprehensiveness, and absence of affective associations suggest
themselves. Many of the principles
applied by the philologists who are
concerning themselves with the construction of an international language
have some application. And the fact
that a particular usage is customary
may have greater disadvantages than
benefits.
Finally, the experience of the older
sciences may be utilized. The terminology adopted by Professors Michael
and Adler has this distinct advantage:
science, rigorously defined, becomes
relatively definite. Other types of
knowledge may be very valuable, but
will not be subsumed under the rubric
"science." In addition to the definiteness thus attained in one direction
at least, there is also the advantage of
having direct attention called to the
relatively smaller degree of validity of
other types of knowledge, with the very
salutary effect of fostering a skeptical,
critical attitude and of dispelling the
smugness that frequently results when
terms and definitions are expanded to
allow everyone from the professional
prize fighter to the experimental physicist to rest under the coveted aegis of
Science.
"UNIQUE DATA" INTERPRETATION

Even if it is impossible to secure
considerable agreement on present
or a difference. Thus, we employ the phrase
'empirical science' in a restricted meaning which
differentiates physics from criminology; we might
have used it in a less restricted meaning in order
to indicate the similarity of physics and criminology as bodies of knowledge somehow based
upon experience. The analysis would not be
changed by this arbitrary change in usage, because physics and criminology are clearly differentiable as bodies of knowledge, and hence some
other word could be used arbitrarily to express
this differentiation. Verbal usage may be
arbitrary, but analysis is not." Michael and
Adler, op. cit., Preface, p. xix.
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controversial
questions
among adherents of the first two positions
discussed, it is certain that the differences between them are relatively
minor when contrasted with those of
the third position which we present.
We refer to those scholars who hold
that social data are unique 18 and that
the methods of natural science and
certainly rigorous scientific techniques
are very inadequate in the study and
of social phenomena.
understanding
Thus, Professor Maclver, one of the
leading exponents of this view, writes:
The trouble is that the social sciences
suffer from certain embarrassments from
which the "natural sciences" are more or
less free. They have to deal with phenomena which involve a kind of causation
unknown in the purely physical world,
since they are "motivated," in fact brought
into being, by that elusive and complex,
but undeniable, reality, the mentality of
man. Not a single object which the social
sciences study would exist at all were it not
for the creative imagination of social beings.
Consequently the social sciences have to
deal with variable and indeterminate concepts such as capital and labor, family and
nation, state and sovereignty, crime and
unemployment, folkways, institutions, social attitudes, and other intangibles. The
social scientist has no "natural" classifications to guide him such as those with which
nature is expected to accommodate the
geologist or the entomologist. Under these
circumstances every authority is free to define his concepts in his own way and treat
them in his own way.19
is Note the positionof ProfessorsMichaeland
Adler that it is possible to have an empirical science of criminology; and that social phenomena
are no more complex, intangible, elusive, etc.,
than physical phenomena. Op. cit., pp. 72-74.
19MacIver, R. M., "Is Sociology a Natural
Science?" (1931) 25 Publ. of the Sociol. Soc. of
Am. 26-27.
"If there is to be any 'objective' social science
it will have to run in terms of the kind of objectivity which social ends and procedures of action actually possess, which is strikingly different
from that belonging to physical phenomena.
The notion of 'uniformity of sequence' is anti-

125

The question of causation 20is merely
another phase of the question of knowledge. Control and prediction depend
in part upon our knowledge of causes.
Can we control criminal behavior by
common sense knowledge? This question raises not only all the difficulties
that we have previously considered,
thetical to that of 'control' by the behaving material itself. There is, no doubt, considerable
uniformity of sequence in social phenomena, but
it runs in terms of meanings and values rather
than physically described events. It is known
by communication, Einfiihlung, 'sympathetic
introspection' (Cooley). This notoriously fails
to yield accurate results uniform for different observers." Frank H. Knight, "The Newer
Economics and The Control of Economic Activity," (1932) 40. Jour. of Pol. Economy, 440.
"If we keep in mind both the historic and the
teleologic aspect of social life, we see an interaction and a mutual dependence between what is
and what should be, between the actual historic
cause and the ideal of what is desired. The subject matter of social science thus differs from the
subject matter of natural science not only in introducing the prospective or teleological point
of view, which describes movements in terms of
their goals, but in the more specific element
of tradition which sometimes takes the form of
conscious teaching and learning. We may say
that the distinctive subject matter of the social
sciences is cultural in the sense defined by Tylor,
to wit 'the complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as
a member of society'."
"For an adequate account of the distinctive
subject matter of the social sciences, we must
take note of the element of tradition, of the ways
whereby social conformity is brought about."
M. R. Cohen, "The Social Sciences and The
Natural Sciences," in Ogburn and Goldenwieser,
Social Sciences and Their Interrelations, pp. 450,
468. Professor Cohen's position is elaborated in
his recently published Reason and Nature,
20Cf. Bertrand Russell's chapter "On the Notion of Cause" in Mysticism and Logic: "All
philosophers, of every school, imagine that
causation is one of the fundamental axioms or
postulates of science, yet oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy,
the word 'cause' never occurs. . . . To me it
seems that philosophy ought not to assume such
legislative functions, and that the reason why
physics has ceased to look for causes is that, in
fact, there are no such things." P. 180.
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but also the new one of "control."
Certainly "control" in human society
is not significantly limited to the direct,
immediate behavior to which we refer
when we speak of driving an automobile or throwing a ball. More than
that, while men control physical objects in this simple, direct manner, it is
clear that they do not control natural
phenomena in the same sense at all.
They do make certain adjustments to
them, and they can predict some of
them. We can fairly well predict the
number of deaths which will occur in
the United States during the next ten
years, but we can do little about controlling their occurrence. If we know
that unemployment, poverty, and subnormality increase criminal behavior,
we cannot as a result of that knowledge
lessen that behavior.
Commonsense and controlControl has been defined loosely,
where it has not been entirely assumed
without any attempt at definition, and
it is impossible within the limits of this
paper to discuss the question in any
detail.21 If we ask does common sense
knowledge permit us to "control" in
Cf. "If men are free they are not subject to
'control' other than their own, and, if there is no
freedom, we are all alike under the absolute 'control' of physical causality, and all talk of social
control is nonsense. Literal 'control' means
that some are 'free' to 'control' others, meaning,
again, that they have power to do so. We confront the old question, or questions, of the r6le of
the individual in history; how much and how
fast can one man change the course of events, and
what is the likelihood that any change he does
produce is for the better? Even afterward, we
cannot tell with any precision. In the mutual
struggle of millions of individuals the effect pro21

duced by any one on all the rest must very ex-

ceptionally be appreciable, and its character depends on the good will and good foresight of the
far future of those who do achieve some power.
Historical students agree that most 'leaders' are
largely followers, or accidental symbols of movements." Frank H. Knight, "The Newer Economics and The Control of Economic Activity,"
(1932) 40 Jour. of Pol. Economy 458.

any sense, we may merely note diverse
answers which cannot now be understood. The authors of the survey
referred to insist that etiological knowledge is scientific (as rigorously defined)
and that only such knowledge can assist in controlling criminal behavior.
At the opposite extreme, Dr. Frank
Knight, who takes an extremely critical, skeptical position,22states that:
Common sense does predict and control,
and can be trained to predict and control
better; but that does not prove that science
can predict and control better than common
sense. And it seems very doubtful whether
in the majority of social problems the application of logical methods and canons will
give as good results as the informal, intuitive process of judgment which, when refined and developed, becomes art. Art is
not science, and only within narrow limits
can it be reduced to science (in which case
of course it ceases to be art). It seems to
us that science is a special technique developed for and applicable to the control of
physical nature, but that the ideal so constantly preached and reiterated, of carrying
its procedure over into the field of the social
phenomena rests on a serious misapprehenSion.23

As is to be expected, the adherents
of the "unique data" interpretation
hold that social causation is different
from physical causation.24 Without
22See Dr. Knight's discussion,
op. cit. supra,
pp. 458-468.
28 Knight, Frank H., "The Limitations of Scientific Method in Economics," in The Trend of
Economics, edited by R. G. Tugwell (1924), p.
254.
24 "But these quantitative indices are merely
evidences of an interaction which they do not explain; they are not the dynamic factors of which
we are in quest. If we appreciate at all the nature of social causation we shall never expect to
find that this factor A, presumptively measured
by this quantitative indication a, contributes 20
per cent, and so forth. Much ingenuity, and
still more energy have been lavished on the attempt to reach results which the very nature of
the subject matter precludes. Social phenomena
are not, like certain physical phenomena, isolable
components of a situation. Social phenomena
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dwelling upon this angle of the problem, it is obvious that we have also
a linguistic problem here which has
only recently been recognized with
reference to the idea of control. Significantly enough, the recognition of
the linguistic problem at this point has
developed with and from analysis of
this concept.

127

behaviorism frequently direct their attack with reference to a very narrow
definition of the term (made possible
by the existence of many varieties), and
assume also the continued existence of a
mechanics which has all but disappeared from contemporary physics.
Many of the ablest advocates of behavioristic approaches and interpretations deny that their position calls
BEHAVIORISM
for the reduction of social phenomena
Underlying the third position de- to the simplest physical phenomena.
scribed above is the suggestion that the Along with these various developments
social disciplines are more closely which have accompanied analysis and
related to art than they are to science.25 research, we find, accordingly, concomiWithout attempting to decide this tant changes in definition and termiissue, we may note the significance of nology.
this view with reference to behaviorism. The literature of psychology RELIANCE UPON INTUITIVE PROCESSES
Whether it is merely a temporary
during the past decade has been devoted so abundantly to a considera- difficulty arising from a limited use of
tion of behavioristic approaches that objective methods, or a permanent
lengthy summarization is unnecessary. limitation which results from essential
Furthermore, in view of the recent differences of social data, it seems clear
revolutionary changes regarding many that in the solution of problems which
fundamental theories in physics on the are dealt with in the administration of
one hand, and of the newer meanings the law, we are compelled to utilize inthat have been assigned to "behavior- tuitive processes. Intention, planning,
ism" on the other (by L. L. Bernard, and motivation (though they may be
A. P. Weiss, R. Bain, et al), it is im- merely general terms which represent
possible to arrive at any but the most a large number of acts) are necessary
tentative conclusions. Opponents of concepts. Nor does it seem possible
at present to make a sufficiently deare aspects of a total non-mechanical consciously
tailed
analysis of behavior to enable us
upheld system of relationships. . ... Behind
to
with these concepts. Withsocial
lie
social
attitudes
and
dispense
every
relationship
interests, which are not separable forces but
out asserting that a highly developed
type-phases of dynamic personality." R. M.
behaviorism may not offer a more
MacIver, Society, Its Structure and Changes
satisfactory explanation of the phe(1951) p. 520.
nomena
associated with motivation,
25 Cf. Gilbert Lewis, TheAnatomyof Science:
"The method of the chemist . . . [and] his data
sentiments, emotions, and so forth
are far less exact [than the physicist's] ....
than is now derived by the use of the
Some are rough measurements, but the greater
intuitive processes alone, it is necessary,
part are not even metrical in character. They
at least in the administration of the
are based upon the observations of thousands of
different substances and from these observations
law, to rely chiefly upon insight and
come rough generalizations like the law of Menimagination. Accordingly, if attendel6eff." P. 169.
tion be centered upon present tech"So, as the organic chemist acquires profiand upon explanations of
ciency in this art, for indeed it is almost an art, he niques
behavior hitherto adduced by objective
acquires an intimate acquaintance with his
material." P. 174.
methods, it seems clear that it is neces-
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sary not only to employ physical and
biological explanations to the fullest
extent, but also to supplement these
by explanations on a purely social
level.
Nor do we need to adopt the view
that social data are essentially different
from any other data. The question,
in any event, is How can social
phenomena be best understood? If we
confine ourselves to present problems
and to available explanations, certain
conclusions are unavoidable. Thus,
in criminology, the method of Dostoievsky, for example, is more valuable
in understanding some types of criminal behavior than any scientific techniques that have been developed thus
far. Yet it is very frequently assumed
(by simply ignoring it) that we must
take imagination or insight as given,
that we need not study, train, or
cultivate it, and moreover, by placing
entire emphasis upon objective methods, that these latter are paramount.
The best work in the social sciences
is a combination of orderly method and
trained imagination; and while we do
not find this anywhere deliberately
denied, and indeed the reverse is true,
nevertheless we believe it may fairly
be stated that a serious limitation of
contemporary criminology is the failure
to train and utilize the processes of
insight and imagination.26
This observation is entirely consistent with further empirical investigation in the social sciences, with
experimentation of every sort. It
26Case studies are only a small beginning; the
most detailed life histories, which have for the
most part been best developed hitherto by the
psychoanalysts, should be compiled without
necessarily adopting the psychoanalytic ideology.
Interpretations made by intuitive processes can
be supplemented by further observation. And a
communication (objectification) of their intuitive
processes by judges, juries, etc. would be valuable. Novelists and biographers who make no
attempt to ape psychologists provide valuable
material.

merely suggests that for an indefinite
future, we must not expect compendent
propositions whose validity may be
determined in part by reference to
scale, galvanometer, or test tube; but
rather, we must continue indefinitely
to use our most subtle imaginations not
only in detecting small relationships in
the vast mass of data that we collect,
but, moreover, in interpreting, evaluating, and using these small truths together with the whole body of our
experience in understanding the social
life about us, including criminal behavior. And of equal importance is
the recognition of the fact that the
methods employed in the social sciences
provide, at the minimum, a large body
of relatively detailed, reliable information upon which insight, imagination,
and judgment can operate more effectively.
DEGREE OF PRECISION REQUIRED

Finally, it may be said that while
researches in the social sciences, including criminology, do not result in propositions which are as exact as those
found in physics, it is necessary to
note that such precision is not required
in the administration of the criminal
law. Precision itself is purely relative,
and the need for any particular degree
of precision is determined by the
purpose in hand. This certainly is
true in law. Thus the adoption of a
wise policy by a legislature would not
necessarily be in the least affected by
the most precise data imaginable.
Professor Herman Oliphant illustrates the point very neatly as follows:
A recent study of the labor injunction
in New York shows that in about 60
per cent of the cases, the temporary
injunction was the only relief sought
and granted. If the legislature should
consider regulation of this type of
remedy, it would not make the least
difference whether the temporary in-
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junction was the only relief granted in
60 per cent of the cases or in 60 per
cent plus or minus a fraction. As Professor Oliphant says:
How exact a particularobservationor
measurementin any scienceneedsto be depends upon the academicor applieduse to
whichit is to be put. The degreeof exactitude needed varies with the subject, with
the problemof that subject and with the
aspect of the problemwith which one is
called upon to deal. . . .
The example cited illustratesa further
fact whichstudentsof the law in particular
shouldkeep in mind when they despairof
scientificmethodsof study. It is that the
discriminatingcapacityof the socialagency
availablefor effectuatingchangesindicated
by their studies (e. g., the legislature)will
constitute the upper limit of exactitude
which the methods they employ in their
study need, for many practicalpurposes,to
be capableof producing.27
NEED FOR STANDARD TERMINOLOGY

We have tried, by placing in juxtaposition three leading interpretations of
social science and results that follow
from them, to demonstrate the utter
futility of attempting to understand
sociological literature without a deliberate, thorough attempt to understand
the terminology employed; that after
allowances are made for differences in
terminology, conflicts disappear in
large measure; and that the necessity
to make such an analysis and to allow
for differences in terminology is peculiarly necessary in the social sciences.
All of these observations apply equally
to attempts to evaluate criminological
research.
We should be rare optimists, however, if we imagined that the conflicting
positions indicated in the above discussion could be removed by a conference on the adoption of a standard
terminology. We have emphasized
27Oliphant, H., "Facts, Opinions, and ValueJudgments" (1932), 10 Tex, L. Rev., p. 130.
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the necessity to make the attempt
for any one who wishes merely (!) to
understand. It would be appalling not
to believe that a great deal of the
confusion in contemporary criminology
would disappear, and we have indicated
some of the steps necessary to accomplish this. Yet the writer, for one,
remains skeptical about the appearance
of a set of symbols which will eliminate
misunderstanding. For one comes
away from these discussions with the
conviction that whether the data are
unique or not, we will for an indefinite
future be handicapped by our inability
to identify social data with sufficient
particularity.28
Reference to any of the data dealt
with in the various social disciplines
supports this opinion. The existence
of physical objects which can be
universally and sufflciently identified
and discussed, which can literally be
pointed to anywhere and everywhere,
facilitates research in the natural
sciences. What social data exist which
everybody everywhere will identify
uniformly? It may be granted that
the processes of perception are one and
the same, but this does not alter the
results nor eliminate existing difficulties.
Moreover, one of the most difficult
things imaginable in dealing with social
phenomena is to find words which do
28 "The
great PoincarT once remarked that
while physicists had a subject matter, sociologists
were engaged almost entirely in considering their
methods . . . there is still in this remark a just
rebuke . . to those romantic souls who cherish
the persistent illusion that by some new trick of
method the social sciences can readily be put on a
par with the physical sciences in regard to definiteness and universal demonstrability. The
maximum logical accuracy can be attained only
by recognizing the exact degree of probability
that our subject matter will allow." M. R.
Cohen, "The Social Sciences and The Natural
Sciences," in Ogburn and Goldenweiser, Social
Sciences and Their Interrelations,p. 454; included
also in Cohen's Reason and Nature,
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not connote to some extent either
approval or disapproval. A perfectly
enormous number of words used in
social science more or less subtly imply
emotional affects of this sort.

humanity he shares. Some degree of
desire for amelioration in human
society seems unescapable, and inseparable from the study of social
phenomena.
Research in the physical sciences,
DIFFICULTY
OF ATTAINING
however, can be carried on with relative
OBJECTIVITY
indifference regarding results one way
Another tremendous difficulty which or another. At the same time it is
besets the student of social phenomena generally believed that magic preceded
is the practical impossibility of achiev- science, and that the high degree of
ing a high degree of objectivity. objectivity which is now found in the
Recognition of the existence and the physical sciences is in large measure
importance of both this and the lin- made possible by the existence of a very
guistic problem in contemporary social large number of abstractions which
research is entirely consistent with all have been created during a long period
three of the positions discussed, and of time.
indeed is the most instructive lesson
But we are concerned here with the
that must be derived from them.
present status of the social disciplines
Significantly enough, theses that the rather than with future possibilities.
study of social data is indistinguishable And to that end, it is necessary to
from that of physical data in any recognize that men studying human
essential characteristic have not satis- beings are not in the same position as
factorily disposed of the striking fact men studying rock formations. The
that the observer is unavoidably "social data" are studying the obinvolved in the whole set-up in a server at the same time that he is
manner unlike that found in connection studying them; while he is trying to
with the exact sciences. It is to be control them, they are controlling him
borne in mind that social phenomena or trying to.
do not allow of simple, direct recording
Criminology, of all social disciplines,
on physical objects (machines, devices, suffers very considerably from this
litmus, and so forth) as do physical limitation upon our resources. Men
phenomena. There is always the in- who attack person and property are
tervention of the observer who must met by many human responses which
serve as both "conductor" and re- consist of various sorts of behavior,
corder of what he has sensed.
but certainly not by the impersonal,
Some of the psychoanalysts, indeed, dispassionate, even indifferent attitude
have suggested that social scientists that is associated with objectivity in
should subject themselves to examina- the physical sciences.
tion in order to discover any comBIASED VIEWPOINTS
plexes which might influence them.
is
a
small
of
The
however,
This,
only
part
particular type of functioning of
the difficulty. For every "normal" an individual over a period of years
person is a combination of instincts, undoubtedly affects not only what he
drives, sentiments, and prejudices of observes but how he interprets. Proevery sort and description. He may fessionalism among lawyers has its
be unconscious of these preferences; he counterpart in every vocation. The
may think he has them under control; prosecutor is invariably "hard boiled"
but he cannot escape the common to the academician, who in turn is an
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impractical "reformer" to the experienced administrator. No doubt the
prosecutor considers himself a realist,
just as the academic person is convinced
that he is an impartial observer.
As a matter of fact, all the influences
of no one knows how many years back,
operate on both. The prosecutor with
his particular bent has become immediately and more sharply conditioned by
being thrown into a fight as champion
of the group and of an unfortunate
victim. That the academic person is
similarly conditioned, though by other
influences no less potent, is only
another way of saying that he is human
and that he has lived in a group of
human beings.
It inevitably follows that a great
part of what passes as criminology
consists of apology or condemnation,
of "explanation" which is really approbation, of expressions of beliefs or
convictions in severity or leniency; in
short, of advocacy of one sort or
another. The invention of techniques
is a valiant effort to diminish this
inevitable human bias and prejudice.
Admitting that social phenomena
can be studied to advantage by natural
science methods, can it be said that to
date they have done more than barely
scratch the surface? To further immediate utilization of existing knowledge it is necessary, first, to recognize
the existence of bias and prejudice;
second, to make such allowances as we
can from a detailed knowledge of the
observer (no life histories can ever be
complete enough to enable us to allow
accurately and fully for all bias, even if
we know how to interpret all the details); and third, to recognize and
account for our own bias as far as
possible.
DEFINITION OF CRIME

Symptomatic of the status of criminology in the hierarchy of the sciences
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is the fact that no satisfactory definition of crime exists. There is more
than a linguistic difficulty involved in
the inability of criminologists to agree
upon a definition of their subject
matter. Definition is essential to discourse; in addition to this minimum
logical requirement, it is necessary to
bound the areas within which criminologists are to work, for the purpose
of actually working there.
At this particular time a number of
leading criminologists have adopted
the legal definition of crime, i. e., the
violation of a penal law. Now this
definition is adequate for the individual
whose concern is whether or not he will
be punished because he violated a law.
There is point and meaning in the
formal definition of crime for this
purpose. But the criminologist who
adopts the formal definition makes his
principal purpose the study of behavior
which is in violation of penal laws; and
so far as conduct is concerned, no one
has pointed out any common characteristic of criminal behavior so
defined. On the contrary, lawyers
have for many years differentiated
criminal laws as felonies and misdemeanors, and on the Continent, as
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations
of mere police orders.
Yet the formal definition of crime
makes no distinctions; and if the criminologists were really influenced by this
definition in the selection of areas of
research, they would be just as interested in traffic violations as in murder,
robbery, or rape. Moreover, a person
may be guilty of violating some laws
(manslaughter) though he does not
act at all; and of violating other
laws (narcotic) by being in possession
of drugs though he is entirely innocent
of the fact. About 75 per cent of the
criminal cases tried in the Federal
courts are the result of laws passed
during the last twenty-five years.
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The repeal of the Volstead law will
mean an enormous quantitative limitation of the field. What can be done
with reference to studying types of
criminals, i. e., of persons who violate
penal laws, or regarding the causes of
such violations, under these circumstances?
As a matter of fact, criminologists
are really influenced by the older
sociological definition of crime and by
other considerations. However, they
have thus far been unable to analyze
their problems and their interests
sufficiently to define their field; or else
criminology is composed of several
fields which overlap and intersect at
so many points that it is impossible to
detect any common characteristics.
In either event, this is a serious limitation.
USE OF OTHERSOCIALSCIENCES

IN LAW
There remain a number of additional special difficulties which confront students of the criminal law.29
29 ,. .. a science of law cannot be built on
experimentation. Like geology its rational

branch must rest on testing by observation."
H. Oliphant,"A Returnto StareDecisis" (1927),
14 A. B. A. Jour. 76.

The doctorshave to a degreeintroducedexperimentationinto medicine. Thus Dr. F. S.
Lee writes:"The modernphysiciandoesnot rely
on a philosophicalsystem . . . he alters the
conditionsandthushe obtainsanalterationof the
phenomenaand a new standpointfromwhichto
view them. He may apply to the diseasepast
experience,it is true, but it is past experience
that has been put to the test of modernexperiment. Moreoverby the aidof furtherexperiment
he pushes out into the unknown, sees disease from unusualstandpoints,and devisesnew
and hitherto unsuspectedmethods of dealing

We pass over the dominance of traditional techniques, the necessity to
follow precedent, and the reverence
for authority, all of which make the
adoption of a scientific attitude all but
impossible. Related in varying degrees to all of these is the very important consideration that problems
in the administration of law almost
always depend upon social policy
rather than upon social science. A
serious difficulty which students of the
law encounter when they look to the
social sciences for assistance in their
own discipline has been pointed out by
Professor K. N. Llewellyn as follows:
In short, then, as to the data already
availablefrom the social sciences,one can
say this: all of their materialis suggestive
for us; little of it is more. They have not
gatheredtheir data for our purposes,and
most of what we want to know we shall
have to find out for ourselves. Not only
are hypotheseslikely to be limited to the
data on which they rest, but data also are
selected,recordedand classifiedfor the purpose in hand; and data selected, recorded
and classifiedfor one purposeare exceedingly likely to be blind or misleadingwhen
approachedforanotherpurpose. The social
scientist has repeatedly left out of considerationpreciselythe portionsof the situation which for us are most relevant or
puzzling.30

While systematic correlation of law
and other social science is still for the
most part confined to devout exhortation, knowledge from other fields has

always seeped into the law."* In the

seem to be room for experimentation. It would
undoubtedly be limited and would require an
attitude on the part of officials which cannot at
present be expected; but the problem certainly
seems worthy of consideration.
30"The Conditions for and the Aims and
with it." Scientific Features of Modern Medicine
Methods of Legal Research" (1930), 6 The Am.
(1911).
It may be questionedwhetherexperimentation Law School Rev. 677.
must be foreverbarredfrom law. In Sweden,
31It is a long stretch from the days when only
legislationis adopted for a limited periodafter those who were as "mad as a wild beast" escaped
studyby a boardof experts. Duringthe ensuing liability to, the recognition by courts in their
period the operationof the statute is studied. actual practices, of borderline cases of abnormalAgain,in the treatmentof offenderstherewould ity which are not as yet expressly provided for in
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present century only, has the attempt
been made by a few legal scholars to
become thoroughly familiar with at
least one social discipline in addition
to their own. This has been directed
by a deeply felt necessity, for, as
Professor Llewellyn has stated, the
legal scholar cannot bodily take over
very much of the work of the social
scientists in its present form.
NEED FOR LAWYER-CRIMINOLOGISTS

This is unfortunate, and its significance for criminal law cannot be
exaggerated. Indeed, in a sense, the
whole cause of the inadequacy of
criminology for the criminal law (in
addition to the limitations of criminology in itself) may be epitomized as
follows: The criminologists are not
lawyers, and the lawyers are not
criminologists. More specifically, we
do not have technologists who are
equipped to apply criminology to the
administration of the law. In contrast with a number of European
most criminal codes. (The Briggs Law in Massachusetts is still the outstanding exception.)
Contributions of chemistry, bacteriology, and
ballistics have been utilized by the courts very
generally. The juvenile court is perhaps the outstanding example of an administration of the
criminal law which has been influenced considerably by social science. It follows from the
position taken in this paper that efficient utilization of the data and research in the social sciences
is inevitably dependent upon personnel. The
recent ecological studies of Park, Shaw, and
Sutherland objectify conclusions of experience
previously held and, moreover, provide a technique for a more discriminate utilization of the
knowledge. Other important studies which
command attention are those on parole prediction, especially by Burgess, Glueck, and Vold.
It seems reasonable to expect that with the aid of
psychiatry these tables may shortly be utilized
not only by parole boards but also by judges in
helping to decide doubtful cases of application
for probation, and even farther back than that,
by prosecutors in helping them to decide whether
to proceed or to nolle prosequi in doubtful cases.
Here would seem to be a unique opportunity for
experimentation.
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countries, we have taken hardly any
deliberate steps to develop the necessary technology. In Italy and Germany, for example, the teachers of
criminal law are very frequently competent criminologists who direct institutes and carry on research.32
It should be reasonably clear at this
time that a criminology constructed in
ignorance of legal problems is all but
impotent to improve the administration of criminal law. The most striking example of the failure to understand
legal purposes and problems and of
consequent ineffectuality is provided
by criminal psychiatry, which is generally selected as the high mark of
accomplishment in the field. Passing

over the dogmatismthat arises from

32 "Outside of the
English-speaking world
these things have been understood for a long
time. The nineteenth century jurists and law
teachers of continental Europe carried scientific
study and development of the criminal law a long
way. On the Continent, every land has conspicuous leaders in the scientific treatment of
criminal law. In every land strong teachers and
creative writers and investigators may be found,
in criminal law no less than in public law and
private law. Indeed, in the universities of continental Europe specialists in criminal law have
known or have learned how to work with
specialists in all the sciences that bear on criminal
investigation and penal legislation and administration. We, on the other hand, have all but left
the field to enthusiasts and cranks and charlatans." R. Pound, " What Can Law Schools
Do For Criminal Justice?" (1927) 12 Iowa L.
Rev. 112.
An example is given by Dr. R. Grassberger,
who writes: "In the spring of 1923 the Austrian
Department of Education ... founded the
.. Institute. Incorporated as part of the
university Law School. . . . The work of the
Institute is divided into three branches . . . I.
Instruction to law students in the criminological
sciences. . . . The purpose of instruction at the
Institute is to supplement the legal training afforded the student through the chief lecture
courses by a varied knowledge which will serve
him later in his capacity as judge, prosecuting
attorney, defense attorney or public official."
"The University Institute of the Criminologic
Sciences and Criminalistics in Vienna" (1932), 23
Jour. of Cr. Law and Criminol. 395-6.
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neglect to appreciate the significance
of the existence of a dozen conflicting
schools of psychology, and of the effect
that this must have upon administrative officials, there has been a failure to
consider sufficiently the distinctive
ends of the law and the philosophy
through which these ends have been
conceived.
Only by making this attempt is it
possible to understand, for example,
why individualization is given only a
limited application as a result of the
legal assumption of free-willing and
therefore responsible individuals, while
psychiatry proceeds upon other hypotheses, the result being that it is
constructed upon an entirely different
level. Recognition of this would permit greater utilization of psychiatry in

the administration of the law. And
we may conclude, in general, that the
usefulness of criminology in law must
inevitably depend upon the appearance
of lawyer-criminologists;33 that is, of
experts who have been trained in both
fields and are able to understand the
problems that arise in the administration of the criminal law and know how
to utilize criminology in the solution
of them.
33 "What is needed is that some scholar, or
better, some group of scholars, think ahead of the
subject, uncover its problems before they arise in
the courts, perceive the relation of its problems to
the history of the criminal law and to the ends of
the criminal law to-day, study the adaptation of
our legal materials to those problems, and thus
give direction to doctrinal development and adjudication, and legislation." R. Pound, "What
Can Law Schools Do For Criminal Justice?"
(1927), 12 Iowa L. Rev. 110.
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